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Essays in Local Labor Economics
Rebecca Diamond
This dissertation consists of three independent chapters all 
related to local labor market and urban economics. Chapter 1 
studies the causes and welfare consequences of the increase 
in geographic sorting of workers by skill from 1980 to 2000. 
Chapter 2 examines the abilities of state and local govern-
ments to extract rent from private sector workers by charging 
high tax rates and spending the revenue on nonsocial desir-
able projects, such as excessive government worker wages. 
In Chapter 3, which is joint work with Guido Imbens, Michal 
Kolesar, and Thomas Barrios, we examine the standard 
practice in regression analysis of allowing for clustering in 
the error covariance matrix when the explanatory variable of 
interest varies at a more aggregate level (e.g., the state level) 
than the units of observation (e.g., individuals). This is a 
common econometric problem when using geographic varia-
tion to study local labor market outcomes.
Chapter 1 
The Determinants and Welfare Implications of 
U.S. Workers’ Diverging Location Choices by 
Skill: 1980–2000
The dramatic increase in the wage gap between high 
school and college graduates over the past three decades has 
been accompanied by a substantial increase in geographic 
sorting of workers by skill.1 Metropolitan areas that had a 
disproportionately high share of college graduates in 1980 
further increased their share of college graduates from 1980 
to 2000. Increasingly high-skill cities also experienced 
higher wage and housing price growth than less-skilled cities 
(Moretti 2004b; Shapiro 2006).
These facts call into question whether the increase in the 
college wage gap reflects a similar increase in the college 
well-being gap. Since college graduates increasingly live in 
areas with high housing costs, local price levels might offset 
some of the consumption benefits of their high wages, mak-
ing the increase in wage inequality overstate the increase in 
consumption or well-being inequality (Moretti 2011b). Alter-
natively, high-housing-cost cities may offer workers desir-
able amenities, compensating them for high house prices, 
and possibly increasing the well-being of workers in these 
cities. The welfare implications of the increased geographic 
skill sorting depend on why high- and low-skill workers 
increasingly chose to live in different cities.
This chapter examines the determinants of high- and low-
skill workers’ choices to increasingly segregate themselves 
into different cities and the welfare implications of these 
choices. By estimating a structural spatial equilibrium model 
of local labor demand, housing supply, labor supply, and 
amenity levels in cities, I show that changes in firms’ rela-
tive demands for high- and low-skill labor across cities, due 
to local productivity changes, were the underlying drivers 
of the differential migration patterns of high- and low-skill 
workers.2 Despite local wage changes being the initial cause 
of workers’ migration, I find that cities that attracted a higher 
share of college graduates endogenously became more desir-
able places to live and more productive for both high- and 
low-skill labor. The combination of desirable wages and 
amenities made college workers willing to pay high hous-
ing costs to live in these cities. While lower-skill workers 
also found these areas’ wages and amenities desirable, they 
were less willing to pay high housing costs, leading them to 
choose more affordable cities. Overall, I find that the welfare 
effects of changes in local wages, rents, and endogenous 
amenities led to an increase in well-being inequality between 
college and high school graduates that was significantly 
larger than would be suggested by the increase in the college 
wage gap alone.
To build intuition for this effect, consider the metropoli-
tan areas of Detroit and Boston. The economic downturn 
in Detroit has been largely attributed to the decline in auto 
manufacturing (Martelle 2012), but the decline goes beyond 
the loss of high-paying jobs. In 2009, Detroit Public Schools 
had the lowest scores ever recorded in the 21-year history of 
the national math proficiency test (Winerip 2011). Histori-
cally, the Detroit school district had not always been in such 
a poor state. In the early twentieth century, when manufactur-
ing was booming, Detroit’s public school system was lauded 
as a model for the nation in urban education (Mirel 1999).
By comparison, Boston has increasingly attracted high-
skill workers with its cluster of biotech, medical device, and 
technology firms. In the mid 1970s, Boston’s public schools 
were declining in quality, driven by racial tensions from 
integrating the schools (Cronin 2011). In 2006, however, the 
Boston public school district won the Broad Prize, which 
honors the urban school district that demonstrates the great-
est overall performance and improvement in student achieve-
ment while reducing achievement gaps among low-income 
and minority students. Similar patterns can be seen in the 
histories of the Detroit and Boston Symphony Orchestras.3 
The prosperity of Boston and decline of Detroit go beyond 
jobs and wages, directly impacting the amenities and quality 
of life in these areas.
I illustrate these mechanisms more generally using U.S. 
census data by estimating a structural spatial equilibrium 
model of cities. The setup shares features of the Rosen 
(1979) and Roback (1982) frameworks, but I extend the 
model to allow workers to have heterogenous preferences 
for cities. The fully estimated model allows me to assess the 
importance of changes in cities’ wages, rents, and amenities 
in differentially driving high- and low-skill workers to differ-
ent cities.
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I use a static discrete choice setup to model workers’ city 
choices.4 The model allows workers with different demo-
graphics to differentially trade off the relative values of cit-
ies’ characteristics, leading them to make different location 
decisions.5 Workers maximize their utility by living in the 
city that offers them the most desirable bundle of wages, 
housing rent, and amenities.
Firms in each city use capital, high-skill labor, and low-
skill labor as inputs into production. High- and low-skill 
labor have a constant elasticity of substitution in firms’ 
production functions. I assume capital is sold in a national 
market, while labor is hired locally in a perfectly competi-
tive labor market. Housing markets differ across cities due to 
heterogeneity in their elasticity of housing supply.
The key distinguishing worker characteristic is skill, as 
measured by graduation from a four-year college. Cities’ 
local productivity levels differ across high- and low-skill 
workers, and the productivity levels of both high- and low-
skill workers within a city are endogenously impacted by 
the skill mix in the city. Thus, changes in the skill mix of a 
city will impact local wages both by moving along firms’ 
labor demand curves and by directly impacting worker 
productivity.
A city’s skill mix is also allowed to influence local ame-
nity levels, both directly, as more-educated neighbors may 
be desirable, and indirectly, by improving a variety of city 
amenities (Becker and Murphy (2000, Chapter ). Indeed, 
observable amenities such as bars and restaurants per capita, 
crime rates, and pollution levels improve in areas with larger 
college populations and decline in areas with larger noncol-
lege populations. I use the ratio of college to noncollege 
employees in each city as a unidimensional index for all 
amenities that endogenously respond to the demographics of 
cities’ residents.
Workers’ preferences for cities are estimated using a 
two-step estimator, similar to the methods used by Berry, 
Levinsohn, and Pakes (2004) and the setup proposed by 
McFadden (1973). In the first step, a maximum likelihood 
estimator is used to identify how desirable each city is to 
each type of worker, on average, in each decade, controlling 
for workers’ preferences to live close to their state of birth. 
The utility levels for each city estimated in the first step 
are used in the second step to estimate how workers trade 
off wages, rents, and amenities when selecting a location 
to live. The second step of estimation uses a simultaneous 
equation nonlinear generalized method of moment estimator. 
Moment restrictions on workers’ preferences are combined 
with moments identifying cities’ labor demand and housing 
supply curves. These moments are used to simultaneously 
estimate local labor demand, housing supply, and labor sup-
ply to cities.
The model is identified using local labor demand shocks 
driven by the industry mix in each city and their interactions 
with local housing supply elasticities. Variation in produc-
tivity changes across industries differentially impact cities’ 
local labor demand for high- and low-skill workers based 
on the industrial composition of the city’s workforce (Bartik 
1991). I measure exogenous local productivity changes by 
interacting cross-sectional differences in industrial employ-
ment composition with national changes in industry wage 
levels separately for high- and low-skill workers.
I allow cities’ housing supply elasticities to vary based on 
geographic constraints on developable land around a city’s 
center and land-use regulations (Gyourko, Saiz, and Sum-
mers 2008; Saiz 2010). A city’s housing supply elasticity 
will influence the equilibrium wage, rent, and population 
response to the labor demand shocks driven by industrial 
labor demand changes.
Workers’ migration responses to changes in cities’ wages, 
rents, and endogenous amenities, driven by the Bartik labor 
demand shocks and the interactions of these labor demand 
shocks with housing supply elasticity determinants, identify 
workers’ preferences for cities’ characteristics. Housing sup-
ply elasticities are identified by the response of housing rents 
to the Bartik shocks across cities.
The interaction of the Bartik productivity shocks with 
cities’ housing markets identifies the labor demand elastici-
ties. The wage differences, driven by the productivity shocks, 
induce workers to migrate to cities that offer more desirable 
wages. The migration drives demand in the local housing 
markets, which impacts housing prices, as determined by 
the elasticity of housing supply. Heterogeneity in housing 
supply elasticity leads to differences in population changes, 
in response to a given Bartik shock. For a given size labor 
demand shock, fewer workers will migrate to a city with a 
less elastic housing supply because rents increase more than 
in a more elastic city. Thus, the interaction of Bartik shocks 
with measures of housing supply elasticity creates variation 
in high- and low-skill local populations that is independent 
of unobserved local productivity changes, which can identify 
labor demand elasticities.
The parameter estimates of workers’ preferences show 
that while both college and noncollege workers find higher 
wages, lower rents, and higher amenity levels desirable, 
high-skill workers’ demand is relatively more sensitive 
to amenity levels, and low-skill workers’ demand is more 
sensitive to wages and rents.6 The labor demand estimates 
show that increases in the college employment ratio lead 
to productivity spillovers on both college and noncollege 
workers. Combining the estimates of firms’ elasticity of labor 
substitution with the productivity spillovers, I find that an 
increase in a city’s college worker population raises both 
local college and noncollege wages. Similarly, an increase in 
a city’s noncollege worker population decreases college and 
noncollege wages.
Using the estimated model, I decompose the changes in 
cities’ college employment ratios into the underlying changes 
in labor demand, housing supply, and labor supply to cities. I 
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show that when a city’s productivity gap between high- and 
low-skill workers exogenously increases, the local wage gap 
between these workers increases. If the migration responses 
to these wage changes lead to an increase in the local share 
of college workers, the wages of all workers will further 
increase beyond the initial effect of the productivity change 
due to the combination of endogenous productivity changes 
and shifts along firms’ labor demand curves.
In addition to raising wages, an increase in a city’s college 
employment ratio leads to local amenity improvements. The 
combination of desirable wage and amenity growth for all 
workers causes large amounts of in-migration, as college 
workers are particularly attracted by desirable amenities, 
while low-skill workers are particularly attracted by desirable
wages. The increased housing demand in high college 
share cities leads to large rent increases. Since low-skill 
workers are more price sensitive, the increases in rent dis-
proportionately discourage low-skill workers from living in 
these high-wage, high-amenity cities. Lower-skill workers 
are not willing to pay the “price” of a lower real wage to live 
in high-amenity cities. Thus, in equilibrium, college workers 
sort into high-wage, high-rent, high-amenity cities.
I use the model estimates to quantify the change in well-
being inequality. I find that the welfare impacts due to wage, 
rent, and endogenous amenity changes from 1980 to 2000 
led to an increase in well-being inequality equivalent to at 
least a 24-percentage-point increase in the college wage gap, 
which is 20 percent more than the actual increase in the col-
lege wage gap. In other words, the additional utility college 
workers gained from being able to consume more desirable 
amenities made them better off relative to high school gradu-
ates, despite the high local housing prices.
This chapter is related to several literatures. Most closely 
related to this chapter is work studying how local wages, 
rents, and employment respond to local labor demand shocks 
(Topel [1986]; Bartik [1991]; Blanchard and Katz [1992]; 
Saks [2008]); Notowidigdo [2011]. See Moretti [2011a] for 
a review). Traditionally, this literature has only allowed local 
labor demand shocks to influence worker migration through 
changes in wages and rents.7 My results suggest that endog-
enous local amenity changes are an important mechanism 
driving workers’ migration responses to local labor demand 
shocks.
A small and growing literature has considered how ameni-
ties change in response to the composition of an area’s local 
residents (Becker and Murphy 2000, Chapter 5; Bayer,  
Ferreira, and McMillan 2007; Card, Mas, and Rothstein 
2008; Guerrieri, Hartley, and Hurst 2011; Handbury 2012). 
Handbury (2012) studies the desirability and prices of 
grocery products for sale across cities. Her work finds that 
higher-quality products (an amenity) are more available 
in cities with higher incomes per capita, but these areas 
also have higher prices for groceries. She finds that higher-
income households are more willing to pay for grocery 
quality, leading them to prefer the high-price, high-quality 
grocery markets relative to lower-income households. I find 
a similar relationship for amenities and local real wages.
My findings also relate to the literature studying changes 
in the wage structure and inequality within and between local 
labor markets (Berry and Glaeser 2005; Beaudry, Doms, and 
Lewis 2010; Moretti 2011b; Autor and Dorn 2012; Autor, 
Dorn, and Hanson 2012). Most related to this chapter is 
Moretti (2011b), who is the first to show the importance of 
accounting for the diverging location choices of high- and 
low-skill workers when measuring both real wage and well-
being inequality changes. Another strand of this literature, 
most specifically related to my labor demand estimates, stud-
ies the impact of the relative supplies of high- and low-skill 
labor on high- and low-skill wages (Katz and Murphy 1992; 
Card and Lemieux 2001; Card 2009). Card (2009) estimates 
the impact of local labor supply on local wages in cities. This 
chapter presents a new identification strategy to estimate 
city-level labor demand and allows for endogenous produc-
tivity changes.
This chapter is also related to the literature on the social 
returns to education (Acemoglu and Angrist 2001; Moretti 
2004a,c;) and work studying the determinants of economic 
growth in cities (Glaeser et al. 1992; Glaeser, Scheinkman, 
and Shleifer 1995; Shapiro 2006). By using the interaction of 
local labor productivity shocks with housing supply elastici-
ties as instruments for education differences across cities, 
I provide a new identification strategy for measuring the 
impact of an increase in a city’s education level on the wages 
for all workers. Further, my findings show that an increase 
in a city’s education level also spills over onto all workers’ 
well-being through endogenous amenity changes.
The labor supply model and estimation draws on the 
discrete choice methods developed in empirical industrial 
organization to estimate consumers’ demand for products 
(McFadden 1973; Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995, 2004). 
These methods have been applied to estimate households’ 
preferences for neighborhoods by Bayer, Ferreira, and 
McMillan (2007). This chapter adapts these methods to esti-
mate the determinants of workers’ labor supply to cities.8 
Chapter 2 
Housing Supply Elasticity and Rent Extraction 
by State and Local Governments
Can government workers extract rent from private sector 
workers by charging high tax rates and paying themselves 
high wages? The determinants and justification of govern-
ment workers’ compensation levels have taken on consider-
able heat in the past few years, as many states and localities 
face budgetary stress. Since state and local governments set 
taxes and government employee wages, government employ-
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ees could earn rents by charging high taxes and receiv-
ing high wages. There has long been debate over whether 
the government acts as a benevolent social planner for its 
citizens or uses its market power to benefit its workers and 
political interest groups (see Gregory and Borland [1999] for 
a review of this literature). In particular, the high unioniza-
tion rate in the public sector may allow union bargaining to 
influence the political process and the decisions of elected 
officials (Freeman 1986). In this chapter, I analyze whether 
government workers receive higher wages than similar 
private sector workers in areas where state and local govern-
ments have stronger abilities to exercise market power.
This chapter develops a model where state and local 
governments set taxes and the level of government services 
to maximize government “profits,” which can then be paid 
to employees as excessive wages. I use a Rosen (1979) and 
Roback (1982) spatial equilibrium model where workers 
maximize their utility by living in the city that offers them 
the most utility based on the city’s wage, rental rate of hous-
ing, tax rate, government services, and other amenities. Thus, 
governments must compete for residents to tax, and workers 
can “vote with their feet” by migrating away from exces-
sively rent-extractive governments.
I show that if state and local governments are using their 
market power to overpay their employees, their abilities 
to extract rents from their citizens are determined by the 
equilibrium migration elasticity of private sector residents 
with respect to local tax rates. Governments must trade off 
the benefits of a higher tax with the cost that a higher tax will 
cause workers to migrate away, leaving the government with 
a smaller population to tax. This is analogous to the standard 
result found in analysis of imperfect competition between 
product producers where a firm’s optimal price markup over 
cost is equal to the inverse elasticity of consumer demand 
with respect to price for the firm’s product.
Unlike firm competition for consumer demand, I show 
that a government’s market power to charge excessive taxes 
remains even when there are a large number of governments 
competing for residents and every government is small.9 The 
spatial equilibrium model shows that when a government 
raises taxes, workers will migrate away to other jurisdictions. 
However, this out-migration decreases the level of labor sup-
ply and housing demand in the area. Assuming labor demand 
curves slope down and housing supply curves slope up, this 
decrease in population raises wages and decreases housing 
rents. Thus, some of the disutility of a tax increase will be 
offset by an increase in the desirability of local wages and 
rents, which limits the amount of out-migration caused by 
the tax increase. Since the local housing and labor markets 
will respond to government-imposed taxes through migra-
tion, the government will always have market power.
An area’s elasticity of housing supply will determine how 
local housing rents respond to population changes in an area. 
Governments presiding over areas with inelastic housing 
supplies will have more market power than governments 
in housing elastic areas. A tax hike by a government in an 
area with inelastic housing supply leads to a small amount 
of out-migration because housing prices sharply fall due to 
the decrease in housing demand driven by the tax hike. The 
housing cost decline offsets the negative utility impact of a 
tax increase with only a small amount of out-migration in 
the housing inelastic area. Thus, governments in housing 
inelastic areas can charge higher taxes without shrinking 
their tax base since housing price changes limit the migration 
response.
If state and local governments exercise more market 
power in areas with inelastic housing supplies, the wage gap 
between public and private sector workers should be larger 
in these areas. I test the model’s prediction by measuring 
variation in public-private sector wage gaps across areas 
with different housing supply elasticities. I measure workers’ 
wages using data from the 1995–2011 Current Population 
Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (CPS-MORG). 
I proxy for a metropolitan area’s housing supply elastic-
ity using data from Saiz (2010) on the share of land within 
50 kilometers of a city’s center unavailable for real estate 
development because of geographic constraints, such as the 
presence of swamps, steep grades, or bodies of water. With 
less available land around to build on, the city must expand 
farther away from the central business area to accommodate 
a given amount of population, driving up average housing 
costs.10 I also use the Wharton Land Use Regulation Index 
from Gyourko, Saiz, and Summers (2008) as a component of 
housing supply elasticity. Since the decision to regulate real-
estate development is endogenous and possibly correlated 
with unobserved characteristics that could impact govern-
ment workers wages, I focus on the Saiz (2010) measure 
of geographic constraints on real estate development as an 
exogenous source of variation in housing supply elastic-
ity. These data are the metropolitan area level. To measure 
states’ housing supply elasticities I use an average of these 
measures across each state’s MSAs, weighted by the MSAs’ 
populations.
I find that the public-private sector wage gap is higher 
in states and metropolitan areas with less elastic housing 
supplies. This result holds when analyzing variation in state 
government-private sector wage gaps across states and in 
local government-private sector wage gaps across MSAs. 
This finding is robust to including a host of controls for 
workers’ demographics and characteristics, including dum-
mies for three-digit occupation codes. Additionally, the local 
government-private sector wage gap is found to be higher in 
housing inelastic MSAs, even when only comparing MSAs 
within the same state.
As falsification tests, I show that housing supply elastic-
ity has no impact on the federal government worker-private 
sector wage gap. Since federal workers’ compensation is not 
derived from government revenues of their place of resi-
2013 Dissertation Summaries 19
dence, the market power of the state and local government 
should have no impact on their wages. Additionally, I show 
that variation in the state government worker-private sector 
wage gap does not vary across MSAs, within a state. The 
public-private wage gaps only vary with housing supply elas-
ticities when the housing supply elasticity variation impacts 
the government’s market power. I also show that the effect 
is larger for government workers who are union members, 
suggesting unions allow government workers to bargain for a 
larger share of government rents.
The CPS-MORG only reports data on workers’ earnings, 
and does not include data on the value of workers’ benefits. 
Gittleman and Pierce (2012) show that government employ-
ees receive more generous benefits than similar private sector 
workers, on average. I use data from average government 
pension payouts per beneficiary across states from the cen-
sus’s 2007–2010 Annual Surveys of Public Employee Retire-
ment Systems as a measure of state government workers’ 
benefits. While I do not have a data source for similar private 
sector workers’ retirement benefits, I show that average 
annual state government pension payouts per beneficiary are 
higher in states with less elastic housing supplies. This sug-
gests that the wage gap estimates from the CPS understate 
the full impact of housing supply elasticity on government 
workers’ compensation.
Previous work has also found evidence suggesting gov-
ernment jobs are more desirable than similar private sector 
jobs. Gittleman and Pierce (2012) show that public sector 
employees are more generously compensated than similarly 
qualified private sector employees. In particular, they find 
that government workers’ wages tend to be slightly lower 
than similar private sector workers. However, the value of 
government workers’ benefits strongly outweighs those of 
the private sector, leading to public sector employees to be 
better compensated overall. Krueger (1988) finds that there 
are more job applications for each government job than for 
each private sector job, suggesting that government jobs are 
more desirable to workers, on average. Additionally, average 
job quit rates reported from the 2002–2006 Job Openings and 
Labor Turnover Surveys show that average annual quit rate 
is 28 percent for private sector workers but only 8 percent for 
public sector employees. These facts taken together suggest 
that government jobs are better compensated than private 
sector jobs, and that there appears to be excess labor supply 
for these jobs, which is consistent with government work-
ers receiving rents. While this evidence shows that govern-
ment jobs appear desirable to workers, it is not clear that this 
desirability is due to rent-seeking behavior of governments 
exercising market power. This chapter shows that an increase 
in governments’ abilities to extract rent directly leads to bet-
ter paid government employees.
The public sector workforce is also highly unionized, 
enabling government employees to bargain for government 
rents. Gyourko and Tracy (1991) use a spatial equilibrium 
model to show that if the cost of government taxes to citizens 
are not completely offset by benefits of government services, 
they will be capitalized into housing prices. Similarly, if high 
levels of public sector unionization lead to more government 
rent extraction, the public sector unionization rate will proxy 
for government waste and also be capitalized into housing 
prices. While Gyourko and Tracy (1991) find evidence for 
both of these effects, it is unclear what drives the variation 
in taxes and unionization rates across localities. This chapter 
uses housing supply elasticity as a source of exogenous vari-
ation in government market power to assess whether govern-
ments take advantage of their power to overpay employees.
Chapter 3 
Clustering, Spatial Correlations, and 
Randomization Inference
Many economic studies that analyze the causal effects of 
interventions on economic behavior study interventions or 
treatments that are constant within clusters whereas the out-
comes vary at a more disaggregate level. In a typical exam-
ple, and the one we focus on in this chapter, outcomes are 
measured at the individual level, whereas interventions vary 
only at the state (cluster) level. This is a common econo-
metric problem when using geographic variation to study 
local labor market outcomes, such as workers’ wages. Often, 
the effect of interventions is estimated using least squares 
regression. Since the mid-eighties empirical researchers in 
social sciences have generally been aware of the implications 
of within-cluster correlations in outcomes for the precision 
of such estimates (Liang and Zeger 1986; Moulton 1986). 
The typical approach is to allow for correlation between 
outcomes in the same state in the specification of the error 
covariance matrix. However, there may well be more com-
plex correlation patterns in the data. Correlation in outcomes 
between individuals may extend beyond state boundaries, 
it may vary in magnitude between states, and it may be stron-
ger in more narrowly defined geographical areas.
In this chapter we investigate the implications, for the 
repeated sampling variation of least squares estimators based 
on individual-level data, of the presence of correlation struc-
tures beyond those that are constant within states, identical 
across states, and vanish between states. First, we address 
the empirical question of whether such correlation patterns 
are present in census data on earnings with states as clusters. 
We estimate general spatial correlations for the logarithm of 
earnings and find that, indeed, such correlations are present, 
with substantial correlations within groups of nearby states 
and correlations within smaller geographic units (specifically 
public use microdata areas) considerably larger than within 
states. Second, we address whether accounting for such 
correlations is important for the properties of confidence 
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intervals for the effects of state-level regulations or interven-
tions. We report theoretical results and demonstrate their 
relevance using illustrations based on earnings data and state 
regulations, as well as Monte Carlo evidence. The theoretical 
results show that if covariate values are as good as randomly 
assigned to clusters, implying that there is no spatial correla-
tion in the covariates beyond the clusters, variance estima-
tors that incorporate only cluster-level outcome correlations 
remain valid despite the misspecification of the error-cova-
riance matrix. Whether this theoretical result is useful in 
practice depends on the magnitude of the spatial correlations 
in the covariates. We provide some illustrations that show 
that, given the spatial correlation patterns we find in the 
individual-level variables, spatial correlations in state-level 
regulations can have a substantial impact on the precision of 
estimates of the effects of interventions.
This chapter draws on three strands of literature that 
have largely evolved separately. First, it is related to the 
literature on clustering, where a primary focus is on adjust-
ments to standard errors to take into account clustering of 
explanatory variables. (See, e.g., Liang and Zeger [1986]; 
Moulton [1986]; Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan [2004]; 
Hansen [2007]; and the textbook discussions in Diggle et 
al. [2002]; Wooldridge [2002]); and Angrist and Pischke 
[2009]. Second, it draws on the literature on spatial statistics. 
Here a major focus is on the specification and estimation of 
the covariance structure of spatially linked data. For text-
book discussions, see Schabenberger and Gotway (2004) 
and Gelfand et al. (2010). In interesting recent work Bester, 
Conley, and Hansen (2011) and Ibragimov and Muller (2010) 
link some of the inferential issues in the spatial and cluster-
ing literatures. Finally, we use results from the literature 
on randomization inference going back to Fisher (1925) 
and Neyman (1990). For a recent textbook discussion see 
Rosenbaum (2002). Although the calculation of Fisher exact 
p-values based on randomization inference is frequently 
used in the spatial statistics literature (Schabenberger and 
Gotway 2004), and sometimes in the clustering literature 
(Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004; Abadie, Diamond, 
and Hainmueller 2010), Neyman’s approach to constructing 
confidence intervals using the randomization distribution is 
rarely used in these settings. We will argue that the random-
ization perspective provides useful insights into the interpre-
tation and properties of confidence intervals in the context of 
spatially linked data.
Notes
1. This large increase in wage inequality has led to an active area 
of research into the drivers of changes in the wage distribution 
nationwide. See Goldin and Katz (2007) for a recent survey.
2. Work by Berry and Glaeser (2005) and Moretti (2011b) comes 
to similar conclusions. Berry and Glaeser (2005) consider the 
role of entrepreneurship in cities. Moretti (2011b) analyzes 
the differential labor demands for high- and low-skill workers 
across industries.
3. The Detroit Symphony Orchestra was one of the top in the 
nation during the 1950s. More recently, it has defaulted on 
loans and is facing a labor dispute over wage cuts driven by 
decreased ticket sales and corporate donations (Bennett 2010). 
The Boston Symphony Orchestra, however, continues to be one 
of the best in the world.
4. The model could be extended to allow for dynamics, as done 
by Kennan and Walker (2011) and Bishop (2010). However, 
panel data are needed to estimate a model of this nature. I focus 
on the role of preference heterogeneity in determining long-
run migration patterns, while Kennan and Walker (2011) and 
Bishop (2010) focus exclusively on high school graduates and 
life-cycle migration patterns.
5. Estimation of spatial equilibrium models when households 
have heterogeneous preferences using hedonics have been 
analyzed by Epple and Sieg (1999).
6. These results are consistent with a large body of work in 
empirical industrial organization that finds substantial hetero-
geneity in consumers’ price sensitivities. A consumer’s price 
sensitivity is also found to be closely linked to his income. See 
Nevo (2010) for a review of this literature.
7. Notowidigdo (2011) allows government social insurance pro-
grams in a city to endogenously respond to local wages, which 
is one of many endogenous amenity changes.
8. Similar methods have been used by Bayer, Keohane, and Tim-
mins (2009); Bishop (2010); and Kennan and Walker (2011) to 
estimate workers’ preferences for cities. However, these papers 
do not allow local wages and rents to be freely correlated with 
local amenities. Bayer, Keohane, and Timmins (2009) focus on 
the demand for air quality, while Bishop (2010) and Kennan 
and Walker (2011) study the dynamics of migration over the 
life cycle exclusively for high school graduates.
9. This result is closely related to Epple and Zelenitz (1981), 
which shows that worker migration between government juris-
dictions is not enough to entirely compete away a government’s 
market power.
10. A full microfoundation of this mechanism can be derived 
from the Alonso-Muth-Mills model (Brueckner 1987), where 
housing expands around a city’s central business district and 
workers must commute from their house to the city center to 
work. Within-city housing prices are set such that workers are 
indifferent between having a shorter versus longer commute 
to work. Average housing prices rise as the population grows 
since the houses on the edge of the city must offer the same 
utility as the houses closer in. As the city population expands, 
the edge of the city becomes farther away from the center, mak-
ing the commuting costs of workers living on the edge higher 
than those in a smaller city. Since the edge of the city must 
offer the same utility value as the center of the city, housing 
prices rise in the interior parts of the city.
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